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Article 2

Batson v. Kentucky: Present Extensions and
Future Applications
Honorable Thomas A. Hett *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the Supreme Court has endorsed the peremptory
challenge-though it is not constitutionally guaranteed-as a
means of assuring an accused's right to an impartial jury.' The
Court has recognized the utility of the peremptory challenge to
eliminate bias on both sides of litigation as well as to assure that
every case will be decided solely on the evidence presented at trial.2
The Court, however, has moved toward restricting the use of peremptory challenges in cases in which they are used to discriminate.
In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court prohibited prosecutors
from exercising peremptory challenges for the purpose of racial
discrimination in criminal trials.3 Though guardedly, the Court
has since extended the reach of that decision, applying the Batson
rationale to defendants' challenges to ethnic discrimination 4 and to
civil litigation.' It is unlikely that the Batson rationale will be expanded to prohibit age or religious discrimination, 6 but it is possi* Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; J.D., DePaul University,
1960. The author wishes to thank Christine Cody, a student at Loyola University of
Chicago School of Law, for her generous assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894), wherein the Court
explained:
The right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of
the most important of the rights secured to the accused .... Any system for the
empaneling of a jury that pre[v]ents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned.
For a discussion of the history of the peremptory challenge in Great Britain and the
United States and an argument that the peremptory challenge should be abolished, see
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.
Q. 369 (1992); see also Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory
Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027 (1991) [hereinafter Harris]. Other commentators argue for a continued, but limited, role for the peremptory challenge. See, e.g.,
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discriminationin Jury Selection: Whose Right Is
It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992).
2. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. See infra part III.B.
5. See infra part III.C.
6. See infra parts IV.B and IV.C.
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ble that it will be extended to gender-biased challenges, and this
possibility has become the subject of controversy among the lower
courts. 7 Still unresolved is the question of the application of Bat-

son principles to disabled jurors. 8
II.

THE BEGINNING: BATSON V. KENTUCKY

In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that if a prosecutor deliberately excludes members of a defendant's race from the
jury without a race-neutral reason, the prosecutor violates the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the
laws.' In reaching that conclusion, the majority recognized that a
defendant does not have the right to a petit jury composed entirely,
or even partially, of members of the defendant's race.'° The Court
found, however, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does guarantee that members of the defendant's race will not be excluded from the jury venire on the basis or
the assumption that members of that race are unqualified to serve
as jurors."I
The "historic step" 12 in eliminating racial discrimination in jury
selection lies in the Batson Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause to the selection of the petit jury and specifically to the
state's use of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial. 13 Batson
recognized that racial discrimination in the ultimate selection of
the jury not only harms the defendant but also denies the excluded
juror the right to participate in jury service.' 4 Further, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the community as
a whole by casting doubt on the entire judicial system.' 5
The Batson decision is also noteworthy for its removal of the
crippling evidentiary burden, as articulated in Swain v. Alabama,
that was imposed on a defendant who alleged denial of this Fourteenth Amendment right.' 6 The Batson Court ruled that the de7. See infra part IV.A.
8. See infra part IV.D.
9. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
10. Id. at 85.
11. Id. at 86.
12. Justice Marshall characterized the opinion as "eloquent" and as "tak[ing] a historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries." Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 89.
14. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
15. Id.
16. The Swain Court declared:
In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function its serves ....
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fendant need not show racially motivated abuse of the peremptory
challenge system beyond the confines of his own case."7 Rather,
the defendant may establish a prima facie case of deliberate discrimination by showing that the facts of his or her case give rise to
an inference of racially discriminatory motivation for peremptorily
challenging jurors of the defendant's race.18 Upon that showing,
the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to justify the challenges. The prosecution must then present racially neutral reasons
for having excluded the jurors. 19
To establish a prima facie case, the defendant (1) must be a
member of a "cognizable racial group"; (2) may rely on the fact
that peremptory challenges allow discrimination to be brought into
the jury selection process "by those who are of a mind to discriminate"; and (3) must show that these facts, along with any other
relevant evidence, give rise to the inference that the prosecutor's
use of the peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination. 2° Thus, the Court's application in Batson of equal protection principles to the peremptory challenge system, in addition to
radically changing the procedural requirements that must be met
by the defendant, leaves no question about the Supreme Court's
intent to abolish racial discrimination in the selection of the criminal trial jury. Equal protection questions have since arisen, however, in instances in which a defendant did not share the excluded
juror's racial identity, the excluded juror shared the defendant's
ethnic heritage, the defendant was using the peremptory challenge
system to discriminate, and a litigant contested a peremptory challenge in the context of a civil case. The following section will discuss the Supreme Court's application of Batson to each of these
questions.
[t]he presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the
State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the
court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected
to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed
from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes."
380 U.S. at 222.
17. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93, 96. In Swain, 380 U.S. at 223, the Court had established that the presumption that the prosecutor had properly used peremptory challenges
could only be overcome by evidence that the prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is
responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors ...with
the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries."
18. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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EXTENSIONS OF BATSON

Racial Identity Between Juror and Defendant

In Holland v. Illinois,21 the Supreme Court rejected a white defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to the exclusion of black jurors. The Holland Court first determined that the white petitioner
did have standing to appeal the exclusion of the only black
venirepersons.22 The Sixth Amendment principle that entitles a
defendant to object to a venire that does not represent a cross section of the community does not require that the defendant and the
excluded persons be of the same race.23 Rather, every defendant
has the right to make such an objection, regardless of whether jurors have been systematically excluded on the basis of race.24
The Court declined to incorporate the Batson test for a prima
facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause into the Sixth
Amendment venire objection. 2 The Sixth Amendment right to a
venire representing a fair cross section of the community facilitates
an impartial jury, not a representative one.26 Impartiality would
actually be obstructed by stretching the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury.2 7 Such an application would serve only to
cripple the peremptory challenge, which historically has allowed
both prosecutor and defendant to remove biased jurors. 28 The
Court concluded that because racial discrimination is beyond the
scope of the Sixth Amendment-the only issue before the Courtthe petitioner did not present a valid Sixth Amendment
challenge.29
21. 493 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1990). For further discussion of Holland, see Robert M.
O'Connell, Note, The Elimination of Racism From Jury Selection: Challenging the Peremptory Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REV. 433 (1991); Carolyn R. Alessi, Comment, Holland v.
Illinois: Are Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges Constitutional?, 26 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 173 (1991).
22. Holland, 493 U.S. at 476-77. Only two blacks were in the venire, and both were
excluded from the jury. Id.
23. Id. at 477.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 478. The Court reasoned that "[a] prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups through peremptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the text of the
Sixth Amendment, is without support in our prior decisions, and would undermine
rather than further the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury." Id.
26. Id. at 480.
27. Holland, 493 U.S. at 483-84.
28. Id. at 484. The Court also noted that the Batson extension of the Equal Protection Clause from the venire stage to the petit jury succeeded "not because the two stages
are inseparably linked, but because the intransigent prohibition of racial discrimination
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to both of them." Id. at 479.
29. Id. at 486-87.
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The Holland Court limited its holding to the invalidity of the
Sixth Amendment challenge to racially discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge. The Court expressly declined to hold either
that the exclusion of the jurors in that case was lawful or that a
white defendant could not constitutionally challenge discrimination against black jurors.30 Moreover, five justices indicated that a
defendant might be able to challenge this type of discrimination on
the basis of the Equal Protection Clause. 31 Thus, the door was
opened for a white defendant's Fourteenth Amendment challenge
to the racial exclusion of black jurors. The following year, in Powers v. Ohio,32 the Supreme Court upheld such an Equal Protection
Clause challenge.
The Powers Court held that a criminal defendant may object to
racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors whether or not the jurors share the defendant's race.33
In Powers, a white defendant invoked the Equal Protection Clause
to challenge the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against black jurors.34 The trial and appellate
courts had denied the defendant's Batson objection to the prosecutor's exercise of seven of its ten peremptory challenges to remove
black jurors. 35 The defendant appealed, contending that his own
race was irrelevant to his right to object to the prosecution's peremptory challenges. 36 The United States Supreme Court agreed
with the defendant, construing Batson to encompass the prosecution's racial discrimination in its exercise of peremptory challenges
regardless of the defendant's race.37
In reaching its conclusion, the Court discussed the distinguishing factor between Powers and Batson: the element of racial identity between the defendant and the excluded juror.38 The Powers
Court determined that limiting the right of a defendant to make an
equal protection objection only to the circumstances presented in
Batson (where there is racial identity) would be inconsistent with
30.
31.
joined
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See id. at 489 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 491 (Marshall, J., dissenting,
by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J.); id. at 505-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
Id. at 1366, 1373-74.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id.
Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1366-74.
Id. at 1368.
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the principles underlying federal statutory law, 39 the Equal Protection Clause, 4° and the rules of standing.4 ' Basing its decisions on
the demands of the statutory prohibition against racial discrimination in jury selection and the Fourteenth Amendment mandate of
racial neutrality in the judicial process, the majority determined
that the element of racial identity found in Batson does not conflict
with the Powers holding:42 racial identity may make the defendant's obligation to prove a prima facie case of discrimination easier,
but it is not always a relevant factor in discerning discrimination. 3
B. The Question of Ethnicity
In Hernandez v. New York, 44 the Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court decision that allowed a prosecutor to exclude two bilingual
Latin-American jurors on the basis of the prosecutor's race-neutral
explanation for exercising the peremptory challenges. The prosecutor had explained that the prospective jurors looked away from
him and hesitated before answering whether they could accept the
official translator as the final arbiter of the witnesses' testimony,
that he did not know which jurors were Latinos, and that he had
no motive to exclude the jurors, since the victims and all of the
civilian witnesses were also Latinos. 4 5
39. Id. Federal law prohibits racial discrimination in the jury selection process by
making it a federal crime. 18 U.S.C.. § 243 (1988).
40. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1368. The Supreme Court also indicated, in Holland, that
the racially motivated exclusion of jurors by peremptory challenge would violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Holland, 493 U.S. at 486-87.
41. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1368. The criminal defendant's right to assert the equal
protection rights of such an excluded juror satisfies the three important criteria for establishing standing: (1) the criminal defendant suffers a real injury because of the racial
exclusion, (2) the excluded juror and the criminal defendant have a common interest in
abolishing racial discrimination from the jury selection process, and (3) the legal and
practical barriers to litigation greatly reduce the likelihood of the excluded jurors' asserting their own rights. Id. at 1370-74.
42. Id. at 1373-74.
43. Id. For further discussion of Powers, see Bradley R. Kirk, Note, Milking the New
Sacred Cow: The Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory Challenge on Racial Grounds in
Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 19 PEPP. L. REV. 691 (1992)
[hereinafter Kirk].
44. 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1873 (1991).
45. Id. at 1864-65. The Court observed that the Batson three-step test for determining whether a prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge has violated the Equal Protection Clause allows for prompt rulings on objections to such challenges without disrupting
the jury selection process. Id. Because the prosecutor explained his use of the peremptory challenges without inquiry from the trial court, the court did not have occasion to
rule on whether the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. at 1866.
The Supreme Court applied the Title VII procedure for establishing a prima facie case
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the Batson test. Id. Therefore, the Court determined that once a prosecutor offers a race-neutral reason for peremptorily striking a
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The Court defined a neutral explanation as one "based on something other than the race of a juror."46 Unless the prosecutor's
reason for a peremptory challenge reveals inherent discriminatory
intent, the court is to deem the reason race-neutral. 7 Because the
prosecutor in Hernandez explained that the challenges were not
founded on an intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors or on
an assumption regarding Latinos or bilinguals, the New York
courts were correct in finding the prosecutor's basis for exclusion
to be race-neutral.4" Furthermore, the Court noted that even if the
prosecution's race-neutral criteria for excluding jurors should result in excluding a disproportionate number of Latinos from the
venire, this result does not make a per se Batson violation: "Equal
protection analysis turns on the intended consequences of government classifications." 49
Once the prosecution has offered a race-neutral explanation for
use of the peremptory challenge, Batson imposes the duty on the
trial court to determine whether the defendant has established intentional discrimination from the totality of the circumstances.50
The trial court judge may consider, among other factors, that the
community setting of the trial includes a substantial Latin-American population and that interested parties to the litigation are of
that same ethnic group, of which a large percentage speak fluent
Spanish.5 The issue becomes whether the trial judge finds the offered explanation to be a pretext.52
As the Batson Court indicated, a determination of intended discrimination constitutes a finding of fact that turns largely on an
evaluation of the prosecution's credibility;53 therefore, the trial
court's ruling must be accorded great deference on review. 54 Accordingly, absent a finding of clear error in the Hernandez trial
court's decision on the issue of discriminatory intent, the Supreme
Court declined to overturn the state trial court's finding.55
venireperson and the trial court has ruled on the issue of discrimination, the preliminary
issue of whether a prima facie case has been established becomes moot. Id. at 1865-66.
46. Id. at 1866.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1866-68, 1871.
49. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1868-69.
51. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1868.
52. Id.
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
54. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868-69.
55. Id. at 1870-71. The Court determined that no clear error existed because the
trial court took an allowable view of the evidence in crediting the sincerity of the prosecutor's explanation. Id. at 1871-72. The trial court could have properly considered the
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While affirming the state court's determination that the exclusion of bilingual jurors was racially neutral in this case, the majority warned that such an exclusion is not always wise and in some
cases might be unconstitutional.5 6 It is quite possible, in regard to
certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that bilingualism
could be treated as a surrogate for race under a Batson analysis.
The Court made it clear that in a future case, a policy of striking
bilinguals without regard to the totality of the circumstances surrounding a particular trial may be found to be a pretext for racial
57
discrimination.
C.

The Question of Civil Litigation

In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ,58 the Supreme Court
ruled that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory
challenges to racially discriminate against jurors. Racially motivated exclusion violates a juror's right to equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment. 9 Thus, the Court continued its expansion
of Batson .60
In a personal injury case, Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete
Company for negligence in U.S. District Court. 6 ' Leesville used
two of its three peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors.62
Edmonson, also black, requested a race-neutral explanation for the
challenges.63 The trial court denied the request on the premise that
Batson did not apply to private civil litigation." Subsequently, a
prosecutor's demeanor, the fact that the prosecutor volunteered his explanation, that the
prosecutor did not know which jurors were Latinos, and that the victims and witnesses,
sharing the excluded jurors' ethnicity, undermined the allegation of a discriminatory motive on the part of the prosecution. Id. at 1872. Moreover, the court may have also
considered that of the four excluded jurors originally contested by the defendant, only
three were verified as Latinos, and two of those were dismissed for cause. Id. Thus, the
exclusion of one, or possibly two Latino jurors who could not agree, without hesitation,
to accept the official translation of the court translator, did not constitute clear error on
the part of the trial court. Id.
56. Id. The Court did not have cause in Hernandez to resolve the more difficult issue
of the extent to which the concept of race should be defined for equal protection purposes. Id.
57. Id. at 1873.
58. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
59. Id.
60. For criticism of this expansion, see Kirk, supra note 43; Eric D. Katz, Note,
Striking the Peremptory Challenge From Civil Litigation: "Hey Batson, Stay Where You
Belongl", 11 PACE L. REV. 357 (1991).

61.
62.
63.
64.

Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2080.
Id. at 2081.
Id.
Id.
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divided en banc panel affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding
that a civil litigant may exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for racial exclusion; the Supreme Court reversed.65
The Court in Powers v. Ohio had set out a two-part analysis,
from which the Court determined that a criminal defendant could
make a Batson objection regardless of his own race.66 First, the
Court established that the racially motivated peremptory challenge
violated the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors. 67 Second, the Court applied well-established rules of standing and concluded that the criminal defendant could raise the excluded jurors'
equal protection rights.68 While Powers and the cases the Powers
Court relied on were all directed at criminal proceedings, none of
the cases implied that racial discrimination was permissible in the
context of civil litigation.
Addressing the first prong of the Powers analysis, the Edmonson
Court noted that generally the constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection apply only to government action.69
Consequently, the legality of race-based exclusion of prospective
jurors in private litigation turns on the extent to which a civil litigant is subject to constitutional restrictions. The conduct of private parties is usually beyond the scope of the Constitution.70
Nevertheless, Leesville exercised its peremptory challenges in accordance with a course of government action and was thereby subject to constitutional restrictions under an analysis previously
described by the Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 71
The peremptory challenge system satisfies both inquiries of the
Lugar analysis: (1) as the cause of a constitutional deprivation, the
system has its source in government authority, and (2) the private
party charged with the deprivation can be described as a government actor.72
65. Id.
66. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1374.
67. Id. at 1370.
68. Id. at 1373.
69. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2082-83 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-42 (1982)
(concluding that whether conduct is "state action" is a function of (a) whether the
claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege rooted
in state authority, and (b) whether the private party actor could fairly be described as a
state actor)).
72. Id. at 2083. Because 28 U.S.C. § 1870 authorized the use of peremptory challenges in civil litigation, without which Leesville could not have discriminated against
jurors, the system clearly has its source in government authority. Id. at 2084. Leesville
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Having ruled that the racial exclusion of jurors in a civil trial
violated those jurors' equal protection rights, the Court turned to
the second part of the Powers analysis, which entailed a determination of the defendant's standing to assert the jurors' rights.73 The
Supreme Court found that the three requirements of standing, satisfied in the criminal context in Powers, were satisfied in the civil
context as well. 74 Finding that prospective jurors in civil trials possess equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment and that
the civil litigant has standing to assert them, the Court concluded
that the Batson procedure of remanding for a factual determination of whether a prima facie case has been established should also
apply to civil litigation.75
D.

The CriminalDefendant's Exercise of Peremptory Challenges

In Georgia v. McCollum,76 the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The McCollum Court prefaced its decision by noting
the procedure established by Batson for finding racial discrimination in the state's exercise of peremptory challenges: once a prima
facie showing of discrimination is made, the burden shifts to the
State to provide a race-neutral explanation for challenging the jurors. 7 The Court also discussed the development of Batson
through Powers and Edmonson.78
had made extensive use of the peremptory challenge system, created by statutory law and
administered solely by government officials; therefore, Leesville could in all fairness be
deemed a governmental actor. Id. The action at issue also involved performing a traditional government function, because the purpose of the peremptory challenge is to select
a jury, a quintessential governmental body without any characteristics of a private group.
Id. at 2085. Moreover, permitting racial exclusion within the official forum of the courtroom casts doubt upon the fairness of the proceedings conducted there and compounds
the insult inherent in racial discrimination. Id. at 2087.
73. Id. at 2087-88.
74. Edmonson, I11 S. Ct. at 2087. Jurors are unlikely or unable to assert their own
rights because the legal and practical barriers are as high for jurors excluded from a civil
trial as they are for jurors excluded from a criminal trial. Id. Second, the relation between the litigant and the excluded juror in the criminal proceeding is as close in civil
litigation as in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 2087-88. Finally, a concrete, redressable
injury caused to the criminal defendant by racial discrimination in jury selection is shared
by the civil litigant, since racial discrimination casts doubt on the judicial system and the
fairness of the proceeding. Id. at 2088. Therefore, the civil litigant has standing to assert
the equal protection rights of the racially excluded juror. Id.
75. Id. at 2089.
76. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
77. Id. at 2353.
78. Id.
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In determining the constitutionality of precluding the criminally
accused from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the McCollum Court made four inquiries: (1)
whether the criminal defendant's race-biased peremptory challenge
caused injuries addressed by Batson, (2) whether the use of the peremptory challenge system constituted state action, (3) whether the
State had standing to assert the rights of the excluded jurors, and
(4) whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant nevertheless prohibited the extension of Supreme Court precedent to the
case at bar.79 The Court answered the first three questions yes and
the last no. 80
The Powers Court had indicated that the Batson decision was
designed to serve multiple ends and had been applied as a remedy
for the harm caused to personal dignity and to the integrity of the
judicial process by racial discrimination in the peremptory challenge system.81 The Powers Court recognized a juror's right not to
be excluded from the petit jury because of race, admonishing that
such discrimination undermines public confidence in the entire judicial system.82 Likewise, the McCollum Court found that racially
motivated peremptory challenges exercised by the criminal defendant harm the jurors as well as the community: "Be it at the hands
of the State or the defense, if a court allows jurors to be excluded
because of group bias, it is a willing participant in a scheme that
could only undermine the very foundation of our system of justice-our citizens' confidence in it."' 83 Thus, the Court established
that the McCollum case addressed the type of harm that Batson
was designed to remedy.
The Supreme Court's second inquiry led to a finding that the
criminal defendant's use of the peremptory challenge system constitutes state action; therefore, the Equal Protection Clause applies. 84 The Court based this determination on the two-part
Edmonson analysis of government action: the constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right having its source in
government authority; and the private party causing the depriva79.
80.
Note,
Some
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 2353-59. For further discussion of McCollum, see Michael M. Raeber,
Toward an Integrated Rule Prohibiting All Race-Based Peremptory Challenges:
Considerationson Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA. L. REV. 503 (1992).
Powers, 111 S.Ct. at 1368.
Id. at 1370.
McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2354.
Id. at 2354-57.
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tion could be described as a governmental actor. 85 The McCollum
Court followed Edmonson in concluding that because the defendant's right to exercise peremptory strikes is given by Georgia state
law, state action was present in the defendant's discriminatory use
of the peremptory challenge.8 6
The Court also applied three Edmonson principles in determining that the second requirement of state action was met. First, because of state-designated procedures for the peremptory challenge
system and because of the jury system, the criminal defendant relies on "governmental assistance and benefits." 7 Next, traditional
government functions served by the peremptory challenge and by
the jury system itself, as established in Edmonson, are amplified in
the criminal context because "the selection of a jury in a criminal
case fulfills a unique and constitutionally compelled governmental
function. '8 8 Lastly, because exercise of peremptory strikes takes
place in the courtroom, the public is likely to perceive any racial
89
discrimination in the procedure as being attributable to the state.
On the basis of these factors, the source of the deprivation can be
described as a state actor, satisfying the second Edmonson requirement for government or state action.
Having established the applicability of the Constitution, the McCollum Court considered whether the State had standing. The
Court applied the three prongs of standing as set out in Powers.90
In addressing the first prong, the Court found that the state undoubtedly suffers a similar injury to that of the defendant when
racial discrimination casts doubt on the integrity and fairness of
the judicial process. 91 The Court's application of the second prong
revealed that the state possesses an even closer relation to potential
jurors than does the defendant in its position of representing the
people. 92 Owing to this position, the state becomes the logical
party for asserting the rights of jurors excluded by racial discrimination.93 In applying the final prong of the standing analysis, the
Court determined that the barriers to the excluded juror's litigating
the exclusion are no less daunting when the challenge is exercised
85. Id. at 2354 (citing Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-83).
86. Id. at 2355.
87. Id. (citing Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083).
88. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
89. Id. at 2356.
90. Id. at 2357. The Powers Court's three-pronged standing analysis is explained
supra note 41.
91. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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by the defendant. 94 The Court, therefore, held that the State had
standing to assert the rights of excluded jurors.95
The Court's final inquiry was whether the rights of the criminal
defendant must prevail over the protection against discrimination
offered by Batson and its progeny. The McCollum Court noted
that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed but
are merely "one state-created means to the constitutional end of an
impartial jury and a fair trial."' 96 The Court also acknowledged the
traditional perception of the challenge as an essential part of a jury
trial and of the significant role the litigants play in selecting the
jury. 97 Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the Edmonson determination that the price of racial stereotyping in the selection of the
petit jury "is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution.' '98
The Supreme Court determined that prohibiting racial discrimination in the peremptory challenge system does not violate the
criminally accused's Sixth Amendment rights. 99 Prohibiting such
discrimination does not violate the right of the defendant to effective assistance of counsel, since articulating race-neutral reasons
for peremptory challenges would ordinarily not cause counsel to
reveal trial strategy or confidential communications."I
Prohibiting
racial discrimination does not impair the defendant's right to a
trial by an impartial jury. As the Holland Court established, the
objective of the Sixth Amendment is an impartial jury with respect
to both parties.' 0 '
With this equal protection inquiry concluded, the Court held
that the criminal defendant's racially discriminatory exercise of the
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2367.
96. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2077). Given the defendant's right to trial
by an impartial jury, the Court acknowledged that there should exist a means of eliminating racially biased jurors from the petit jury. Id. at 2358-59. Nonetheless, the Court
distinguished the invidious discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge by a
party and the challenging of a racially prejudiced juror. Id. at 2359. As the Powers
Court made clear, stereotyping and assuming prejudice based solely on race is unacceptable. Id. (citing Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370). Thus, the Court reaffirmed that peremptory
challenges may be based neither on race nor on racial stereotypes. Id.
99. Id. at 2358.
100. Id. The Court stated that where a peremptory challenge would reveal trial
strategy, the trial court could accommodate the defendant's concerns by holding an in
camera discussion. Id.
101. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358; see also Holland, 493 U.S. at 483 (stating that
"[p]eremptory challenges ... are a means of 'eliminating extremes of partiality on both
sides,' thereby 'assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury' " (citations
omitted)).
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peremptory challenge is unconstitutional and that the state may
raise the challenge to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges.'' 2 Hence, the state's demonstration of a prima facie case of
such discrimination by the defendant requires the defense to articu03
late race-neutral reasons for suspect challenges.
IV.
A.

FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF BATSON

DisagreementAbout Application to Gender Discrimination

Although there is some disagreement among them, federal appellate courts seem reluctant to extend the equal protection principles of Batson to the issue of sex discrimination."° The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court's omission of gender
discrimination in Batson indicated its intent to limit the application
of equal protection principles to racial discrimination." 5 Acknowledging that the restrictions imposed by the Equal Protection
Clause undoubtedly apply to gender discrimination in other circumstances, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless emphasized that there
was "no evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court would apply
normal equal protection principles to the unique situation involving peremptory challenges."'' 06 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit refused to recognize black females as a discrete group, construing
Batson to require only a sensitivity to racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. 107
Recently, the Fifth Circuit followed the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, ruling that Batson does not apply to gender-based peremptory challenges. 08 In United States v. Broussard, the court
reasoned that "Batson is a prophylactic device reached for in response to demonstrated need."'01 9 Though noting the disagreement
102. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357, 2359.
103. Id.
104. For further discussion of the application of Batson to gender-based peremptory
challenges, see Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1920 (1992); S. Alexandria Jo, Comment, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at Gender-BasedPeremptory Challenges, 22 PAC. L.J.
1305 (1991).
105. Hamilton v. United States, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
106. Id. at 1042.
107. United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 989 (1992).
108. United States v. Broussard, No. 92-4558, 1993 WL 72937, at *4 (5th Cir. March
17, 1993).
109. Id.
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in both state and federal courts on the issue,"10 the Broussard court
reasoned that the Batson rationale should not extend to gender bias
in the same manner as race bias because women are not a numerical minority and because women do not face the same barriers to
jury participation.' 1 '
The preservation of the peremptory challenge is a common concern among federal courts interpreting the scope of Batson. 12
Moreover, at least four Supreme Court Justices have shown concern about the recent trend toward restriction of the peremptory
challenge. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, objected to the classification of the peremptory
challenge as state action for the purpose of imposing constitutional
restraints."1 3 Most recently, Justice Thomas's concurrence in McCollum cautioned against using the Constitution to limit the exercise of peremptory challenges. "' Justice Thomas's ominous
conclusion, "[n]ext will come the question whether defendants may
exercise peremptories on the basis of sex,"' 15 indicates that attempts at such restriction will be met with opposition.
Despite concerns over further restricting the use of peremptory
challenges, the Ninth Circuit has espoused a broader interpretation
of Batson. In U.S. v. DeGross," 6 the Ninth Circuit found that the
evils resulting from gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges were the same as those caused by racial discrimination."17 Both forms of discrimination in the peremptory
challenge system injured the excluded juror, undermined public
confidence in the judicial process, and provoked community prejudice.III The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that since the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was used to address these injuries in Batson, so should the Fifth Amendment's
equal protection principles apply at the federal level." 9
State courts are even more divided on the question of whether
110. Id. at *3.
111. Id. at *4.
112. See, e.g., Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting the conflict between those who would "completely abolish peremptory challenges" and those who would "restore peremptory challenges to the pre-Batson right with
no exceptions").
113. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
114. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 1439.
118. Id. at 1439-40 & n.9.
119. Id. at 1443.
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equal protection principles should be applied to sex discrimination.
For example, recently the Maryland Court of Special Appeals declined to extend Batson to gender discrimination. 20 On the same
date, however, in Washington v. Burch,'2 ' the Washington Court of
Appeals held that federal equal protection principles prohibited
gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptories. Even before
the Burch decision, in People v. Irizarry,122 a New York court extended Batson to gender discrimination, reasoning that striking
women from the petit jury on the sole basis of their gender violated
the equal protection rights of both the excluded jurors and the defendant. The states in which courts have declined to extend Batson
to gender discrimination are Kentucky,1
souri, 12 5 Nebraska, 26 and Rhode Island.12

23

Louisiana, 24 MisStates that have ap-

plied Batson to prohibit gender discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory
challenges are California,121 Illinois,' 29 New Mex130
ico,

and New York.13 1

As exemplified by the Illinois Court of Appeals decision in People v. Mitchell,3 2 reliance on state constitutional provisions regarding gender discrimination has contributed to the state courts'
expansion of the scope of Batson. In contrast with the Washington
court, which applied federal equal protection principles to prohibit
120. Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42, 59-61 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (concluding that
gender-based peremptory challenges violated neither federal nor state law).
121. 830 P.2d 357, 362 (1992).
122. 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)..
123. Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
124. State v. Morgan, 553 So. 2d 1012, 1018 (La. Ct. App. 1989), writ denied, 558 So.
2d 600 (La. 1990).
125. State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). But see Pullen v. State,
Nos. 56820, 58075, 1992 WL 121791, at *1, *9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the Clay
decision but finding Batson applicable to gender discrimination and transferring the case
to the Missouri Supreme Court to resolve conflict). In State v. Pullen, 843 S.W.2d 360,
364 (Mo. 1992), the Missouri Supreme Court found that the Batson issue was not properly preserved for appeal and declined to resolve the issue. Nevertheless, the court also
found that the prosecutor's actions were proper in excluding female members of the venire. Id. at 365.
126. State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666-67 (Neb. 1989).
127. State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987).
128. Di Donato v. Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr. 751, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
129. People v. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d 882, 888 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal allowed, 602
N.E.2d 467 (Ill. 1992).
130. State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65
(1991).
131. People v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Irizarry, 560
N.Y.S.2d at 281.
132. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d at 887, 888.
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the state's exercise of gender-biased peremptory strikes, 33 most
state courts seem to rely on their own state constitutions, partially
1 34
or wholly, to achieve the same end.
In Illinois, the Mitchell Court based its decision on the guarantee of equal protection provided by Article 1, Section 18, of the
Illinois Constitution: "The equal protection of the laws shall not
be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of
local government and school districts."'' 35 Applying the Edmonson
finding that the exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state
action and the Powers determination that the excluded juror possesses a right not to be discriminated against, the Illinois Court of
Appeals concluded that sex discrimination in the use of peremptories violated Article I, Section 18, of the Illinois Constitution: "We
find no foundation in justice or in logic to differentiate between
discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges based on racial or
ethnic grounds, rather than on grounds of whether the prospective
' 36
juror is a male or female."'
An indication that the United States Supreme Court may expand Batson to include gender bias is found in the recent incorporation of Title VII procedures in decisions such as Hernandez v.
New York. t37 The Hernandez Court applied the Civil Rights Act
principle of establishing a prima facie showing of discrimination in
the context of employment discrimination to the Batson objection.' 38 The Court applied Title VII procedures in affirming that
the prosecutor's unsolicited, race-neutral reasoning for peremptory
challenges rendered the issue of whether the defendant established
a prima facie case of discrimination moot. 139 Although Hernandez
dealt with ethnic discrimination, the Civil Rights Act, the very
purpose of which is to further basic personal rights, includes reference to gender discrimination. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act
133. Burch, 830 P.2d at 362.
134. See, e.g., Di Donato, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 756 (relying on the California Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment); Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 48 (relying on the
New Mexico Constitution); and Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93 (relying solely on the New
York Constitution).
135. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d at 888. Quoting People v. Ellis,
311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (I11. 1974), the Mitchell Court stated: "[Iln view of [the] explicit
language [of the Illinois Constitution] and the debates, we find inescapable the conclusion
that it was intended to supplement and expand the guaranties[sic] of the equal protection
provisions of the Bill of Rights." Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d at 888.
136. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d at 888.
137. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
138. Id. at 1869.
139. Id. at 1866.
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of 1964140 prohibits employment discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Likewise, section 717'
prohibits the same forms of discrimination in federal government
employment.
In Hernandez, the Supreme Court applied employment discrimination procedures to ethnic discrimination, 4 2 but the Court may
also use Title IX in the context of gender-based discrimination.
Section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964143 authorizes the Attorney General to intervene in a private action for relief from a denial
of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The significant addition of sex to the listed forms of discrimination
in 19721 4 signified the intention of Congress to include women
among those deserving equal protection of the laws.
Furthermore, outside of the Civil Rights Act, there is federal
statutory support for prohibiting gender-based discrimination in
the peremptory challenge system. Section 1862 of Title 28145 expressly prohibits the discriminatory exclusion of a citizen from a
grand or a petit jury in the U.S. district courts. The statute forbids
bias based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and eco1 46
nomic status.

In a case that does not directly involve Batson principles, the
Supreme Court has given another indication of its possible future

direction. In Lockhart v. McCree,1 47 the Court said:

"Death qualification," unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks,
women, or Mexican-Americans from jury service, is carefully
designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the
law to the facts of the 48
case at both the guilt and sentencing
phases of a capital trial.1

Overall, the Court's current direction makes the inclusion of
gender discrimination a significant possibility in the future. But we
140. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1988)).
141. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(1988)).
142. 111 S. Ct. at 1866-69.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1988).
144. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 906(a), 902, 86 Stat.
235, 375 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1988)).
145. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
146. Id.
147. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
148. Id. at 175-76.
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must be careful how gender bias is defined. Sex bias may be
banned, but since sex or gender bias would normally be understood
to mean bias against men or women, would it apply to sexual orientation? Homosexuals have been determined not to be a cognizable group;149 therefore, it appears that peremptorily challenging
homosexuals is not banned under Batson principles.
B.

Unlikely Application of Batson to Age Discrimination

Life experiences and values differ so greatly within age groups
that there are no common characteristics with which to categorize
their members in order to form a basis for age discrimination.1 0
In 1985, in Barber v. Ponte,'5 ' the First Circuit held that young
adults do not constitute a cognizable group for purposes of an
equal protection challenge to a peremptory strike. The court noted
that persons between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four showed
significant contrasts in such social indicators as marriage and divorce rates, school enrollment, years of education, economic sta149. Sex discrimination is narrowly defined as gender bias; it does not reach the separate issue of sexual orientation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is interpreted as
extending to gender bias alone. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69, 70
(8th Cir. 1989) (finding the Title VII term sex to refer to gender only), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1089 (1990). Any attempts at expanding Title VII protection to include sexual identity and orientation have been rejected. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VII protection did not extend to transsexuals), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30
(9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to extend Title VII coverage to groups alleging discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation).
Similarly, equal protection principles do not afford special protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Ninth Circuit has rejected equal protection challenges to governmental procedures that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571-75
(9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting equal protection challenge by homosexuals against Department
of Defense policy of conducting extensive background investigation of all homosexual
applicants for high security clearance positions); Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency,
866 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment
against a gay woman on a claim that she was denied a security clearance because she was
gay). Furthermore, the High Tech court found that homosexuals do not constitute a
suspect or even quasi-suspect group. High Tech, 895 F.2d at 573. The court reasoned that
homosexuality, though the target of discrimination, is not an immutable characteristic
but rather a behavioral characteristic, unlike traits such as race, gender, or alienage that
make up the basis of recognized suspect classes. Id. Therefore, peremptorily challenging
homosexuals cannot be banned under Batson, since homosexuals do not constitute a cognizable group. But cf Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that although homosexuals were not a suspect class,
the group is entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause).
150. Harris, supra note 1, at 1059.
151. 772 F.2d 982, 996-1000 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050
(1986).
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tus, employment history, and criminal history. 5 2 The court noted
its concern that "[i]f the age classification is adopted, surely bluecollar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless
variety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treatment." 15 3 The Kentucky Supreme Court, in a similar vein, concluded that the group young adults defies definition and that its
acceptance would begin an endless maze of juror classifications:
young adults, middle-aged adults, elderly adults, and so forth.154
Two years after Barber, the First Circuit affirmed its position on
age discrimination in the peremptory challenge system when, in
United States v. Cresta,' 5 it reevaluated the issue in light of Batson. The court concluded that nothing in Batson extended the
principle of cognizability to young adults. 56 In denying certiorari
to the specific question of Batson's application to young adults,' 57
the Supreme Court seems to have indicated that its decision in Batson was not intended to cover age discrimination.
C.

Unlikely Application of Batson to Religious Discrimination

It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will expand Batson's reach
to include religious discrimination. Given the unique nature of the
peremptory challenge and the recent opposition among the Justices
to further restriction of its use, the stretching of Batson to religious
discrimination is improbable. In fact, in his dissent in Edmonson,
Justice Scalia recognizes religion as a legitimate factor in a private
party's exercise of peremptory challenges.158 Moreover, according
to the Powers Court, the main premise of the juror's right not to be
discriminated against applies only to racial discrimination in the
jury selection process.'5 9 The Court has referred to the prohibition
against such discrimination as reflecting "the central concern of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'" If racial discrimination is the
core of the Fourteenth Amendment and if Congress has not
deemed it necessary to prohibit religious discrimination in jury se152. Id. at 998-99.
153. Id. at 999.
154. Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Ky. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
984 (1984).
155. 825 F.2d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
156. Id.
157. Impemba v. United States, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
158. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1369 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988)); see also supra note 39.
160. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1369 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 507 (1972)
(White, J., concurring)); see also supra notes 39-40.

19931

Batson v. Kentucky

lection, the Supreme Court is not likely to prohibit religious discrimination in this context at this time.
Few courts have addressed the issue of religious discrimination
in the context of the peremptory challenge, and among these the
trend has been to reject expanding Batson. In People v. Johnson,16'
the California Supreme Court defined religious discrimination as a
form of group bias but doubted that a religious group would constitute a cognizable group under Batson. Similarly, in State v.
Antwine, 62 the Supreme Court of Missouri acknowledged religion
as a part of the fundamental background information on which
counsel must rely in exercising peremptory challenges.
State courts do have the option of using the equal protection
principles embodied in their own constitutions to deal with religious discrimination. For example, the North Carolina Constitution prohibits exclusion of a juror because of "sex, race, color,
religion or national origin."1 63 Absent Supreme Court direction,
states have the power to eliminate religiously discriminatory peremptory challenges through their own means. Even before Batson,
a lower New York court said that the exclusion of jurors solely
because their religious affiliation was the same as the defendant's
violated the state constitution.164

D. Is Batson Applicable to the Disabled?
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),1 65 which became
effective January 26, 1992, "prohibits discrimination against people
with disabilities in employment, transportation, public accommodations, telecommunications, and state and local government services." 1 66 Congress passed the ADA "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 167 Does this congressional enactment move Batson into the arena of preventing
peremptory challenges based on a person's disability? Maybe. The
161. 767 P.2d 1047, 1053 n.3 (Cal. 1989).
162. 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
163. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26.
164. People v. Kagan, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1979). However, the court
could not find enough evidence of the prosecutor's systematic and discriminatory exclusion of Jewish jurors. Id. at 990.
165. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,102-12,213 and 47
U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. 11 1990) (effective January 26, 1992).
166. Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744, 752 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1990); Moore v. Sun Bank, 923 F.2d 1423,
1424 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991); Cassista v. Community Foods, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 106 n.8
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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cases seem to suggest that some disabilities can call on the Batson
rationale but some cannot. By their very nature, some disabilities
suggest that denying the disabled person the opportunity to be a
petit juror would not constitute impermissible discrimination.
Even before the ADA was enacted, the court in People v. Green
relied on a New York constitutional provision banning discrimination against the disabled 168 to hold that a prosecutor cannot peremptorily challenge a deaf juror solely because of the disability of
deafness. 169 The challenge violated the juror's right to equal protection under the New York Constitution. 170 The court added that
since the prosecutor admitted that the sole reason he excused the
deaf juror was the juror's disability and not any doubt he had
about the juror's ability to communicate, the prosecutor's chal71
lenge did not have a rational basis. 1
In People v. Guzman, decided a few months before Green, the
New York Court of Appeals did not mention the ADA when it
ruled that deafness, in and of itself, would not disqualify a prospective juror as long as the accommodations necessary to allow the
juror to fulfill his or her duties would not interfere with the defendant's trial rights. 17 2 The court stated that although a civil right to
serve as a juror exists, "this right is conditioned on [an] individual's ability to carry
out the primary functions of the jury-to pro173
vide a fair trial."'
This decision suggests that not all disabilities would bring Bat168. Article I, Section 11 of the New York Constitution provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of
the state.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. The Constitution of the State of Illinois has a similar provision,
Article I, Section 2, that states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws." ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 2.
169. People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132-33 (1990).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 133. The court also commented that to challenge the deaf juror solely
because of the deafness was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, even though the ADA was not yet effective. Id. In sum, the court
concluded that "Batson-like protection should be afforded to a hearing impaired wouldbe juror." Id. at 131.
172. People v. Guzman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (1990). In this case, the court noted that
the presence of a sign-language interpreter would enable the juror to serve effectively but
would not interfere with the defendant's "fundamental trial rights." Id.
173. Id.
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son into play. In Duc Van Le v. Ibarra,17 1 the Colorado Supreme
Court considered whether the ADA makes all disabled persons,
without regard to the nature of their disabilities, members of one
discrete group under the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,17 5 the Ibarra court engaged
in an exhaustive discussion of which groups are to receive special
protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and which groups are not. The Ibarra court concluded that the ADA declaration that "individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority," 176 is not applicable to all disabled: mentally retarded persons do not constitute such a discrete
group that a state would be prohibited from enacting laws or rules
that might ultimately have a discriminatory impact on mentally
retarded persons. 177
The City of Cleburne and Ibarra decisions appear to require a
court that is faced with a Batson challenge based on a juror's disability to make a preliminary determination of whether the disability has distinguishing characteristics that are relevant to interests
the state has the authority to implement. Is there a rational basis,
premised on state interest, to discriminate? Might the Green "I
and Guzman 179 discussions apply to any determination of whether
there is a rational basis to discriminate? A juror must be able to
understand all of the evidence presented, evaluate that evidence in
a rational manner, communicate effectively with the other jurors
during deliberations, and comprehend the applicable legal principles. Any accommodation provided to a disabled juror to allow
174. Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91SC189, 1992 Colo. LEXIS 385 (Colo. Apr. 20,
1992).
175. Id. at *26-27 (noting that in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985), the Court refused to identify mentally ill persons as a suspect or quasisuspect class under an equal protection analysis and, thereby, granted great deference to
legislative decisions about how the interests of this group should be protected).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7). The ADA further states:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority, who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and regulated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society ....
Id.
177. The court stated that "[t]o declare the mentally ill to be a suspect or quasisuspect class would be contrary to previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court
that have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution."
Ibarra, 1992 Colo. LEXIS 385, at *29.
178. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 132-33.
179. Guzman, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
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the juror to participate must
not, itself, interfere with a defendant's
80
1
rights.
trial
fundamental
It will be interesting to see how the courts handle ADA-based
challenges to the exercise of peremptory challenges. The Michigan
Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest that the ADA may
apply to discrimination based on a perceived disability even if, in
fact, no disability exists.' 8 ' The permutations are mind-boggling.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Batson v. Kentucky principles, first applied to ban racial discrimination by prosecutors in the exercise of peremptory challenges in criminal trials, has been extended by the Supreme Court
to challenges exercised by defendants, challenges based on race regardless of the race of the juror, challenges based on ethnicity, and
challenges exercised in civil cases. It appears that the Supreme
Court will not extend Batson to peremptory challenges premised
on age or on religious affiliation. The jury is out on whether the
Supreme Court will apply Batson to gender bias. It is likely, however, that both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Illinois will extend Batson to gender-biased peremptory
challenges. The impact of the equal rights provisions of state constitutions on the use of peremptory challenges cannot be ignored,
or underestimated, as an alternative basis for further extension of
Batson. Lastly, the impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act
on Batson principles is still to be determined.

180.
181.

Id. at 9.
Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657, 661-62 (Mich. 1992).

